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STA TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from a failed attempt to fonn a partnership between a dairy fanner, 
a milk hauler, a real estate agent and an accountant for the purpose of purchasing and 
operating a cheese factory and restaurant in Thayne, Wyoming. The dairy farmer, Gaylen 
Clayson, filed suit against the real estate agent, Don Zebe, and the accountant, Rick Lawson I, 
for breach of contract or, in the alternative, unjust enrichment. Clayson later amended his 
Complaint to include claims for duress, extortion, slander and defamation. Zebe and Lawson 
counterclaimed for conversion, replevin and misrepresentation. The counterclaim was 
voluntarily dismissed prior to the case going to trial. 
On motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that no partnership was fonned, 
no express contract to pay Clayson for his alleged partnership interest existed and Clayson's 
claims for duress, extortion, slander and defamation were not supported by the evidence. The 
trial court, however, concluded that issues of fact existed which precluded summary 
judgment on the equitable claims as to whether Zebe and Lawson had an obligation to 
reimburse Clayson for refurbishment expenses to the factory and restaurant under either an 
implied-in-fact contract or by way of unjust enrichment. 
The case was tried over three days to the trial court sitting without a jury. The trial 
court found in favor of Clayson holding that the conduct of the parties created a contract-in-
lLaze, LLC was also named as a Defendant. Because, it is wholly owned by Zebe and 
Lawson identifYing it separately does not add much to the discussion ofthe case or issues on 
appeal. Therefore, unless the context requires it reference to Zebe and Lawson will include Laze, 
LLC. 
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fact and an implied-in-Iaw contract requiring Zebe and Lawson to reimburse Clayson for 
refurbishment expenses in the amount of $97 ,310.94. Finding that both parties prevailed in 
part and that there was no commercial transaction, but only an equitable claim, the trial court 
denied attorney fees and costs to any party. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Clayson has been a dairy fanner for 38 years. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 9, LL 9 - 15) In June 
of 2008, Clayson met with Morris Farinella who was 85 and owned the cheese plant and 
restaurant in Thayne, Wyoming. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 30, LL 12 - 21) The cheese plant had been 
shut down for about 2 Y:2 years and was in bankruptcy. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45) The restaurant was 
open. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 29, LL 3 - 5) Morris Farinella was trying to sell the cheese plant and 
restaurant with the help of a Wyoming real estate agent through the bankruptcy court. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 27 L 20 - p. 28, L 11) Clayson had expressed an interest in purchasing the cheese 
plant and restaurant. (Tr. Vol. I, LL 16 - 22) 
Morris Farinella asked Clayson to help operate the restaurant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 30, L 
22 - p. 31, L. 6) On July 1,2008, Clayson took over operation of the restaurant. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 32, LL 5 - 8) It was not until August 28,2008, that Clayson had anything in writing 
authorizing him to operate the restaurant and it only authorized him to run the restaurant, take 
care of the worker's compensation insurance for the restaurant employees and take care of 
the cleanliness of the plant. (Exhibit 5A; Tr. Vol. I, p. 237, L 17 - p. 240, L 6) The money 
from operating the restaurant was deposited into an account which had been established for 
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the restaurant and occasionally Clayson put some of his own money into the account. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 77) 
Clayson had no ownership interest in the restaurant or the cheese plant on July 1,2008 
and never thereafter had an ownership interest in the restaurant or cheese plant. (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 215, L 21 - p. 216, L 4; 248, LL 21 - 24) Clayson believed he would be able to put 
something together to buy the restaurant and cheese plant so that he would have a place to 
sell his milk. (Tr. Vol. I,pp. 216 - 218) Clayson told Morris Farinella that if the cheese plant 
was not up and running by October 2008 he could not be a part of it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 40, LL 
5 - 21) 
The milk hauler, J effRandall introduced Clayson to Zebe. Clayson, Zebe and Lawson 
all agree that the initial introduction was for the purpose of having Zebe write a business plan 
for Clayson, not finance the acquisition of the plant and restaurant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 231, LL 
18 - 23; Tr. Vol. II, p. 351, L 20 - p. 352, L lO; Tr. Vol. II, p. 4l3, LL 2 - 9) 
Clayson spent time from July 1,2008 to October 8, 2008, at the restaurant and cheese 
plant. He managed the restaurant, opened and closed the restaurant, worked around the plant, 
incurred expenses to refurbish the plant and restaurant and supervised others in working 
around the plant. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43 - 64) All of the work Clayson perfonned at the plant 
and restaurant was perfonned before he left on October 8, 2008. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 247, LL 12-
16) All the expenses for which Clayson sought reimbursement were not approved in advance 
by Zebe or Lawson. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 232, L 5 - p. 237, L l3) In fact, Clayson stipulated that 
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none of the expenses were incurred and none of his labor was performed at the request of 
Zebe and Lawson. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL 1 - 10) 
Although the exact timing was disputed, Zebe and Lawson became interested in 
acquiring the plant and restaurant at approximately the same time Clayson told them he was 
out of money and unable to continue operating the restaurant. (Tr. Vol. I, Tr. Vol. It p. 416, 
LL 2 - 25) On October 2,2008, Rick Lawson prepared paperwork to form SVC, LLC which 
included Clayson, Lawson and Zebe as members. (Exhibit J) Although Clayson was briefly 
a member of SVC, LLC his name was removed from the LLC shortly after he turned the 
restaurant over to Zebe and Lawson on October 8, 2008. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 252, L 4 - p. 253, L 
10; Tr. Vol. II, p. 418, L 18 - p. 420, L 25) 
Despite the removal of his name from SVC, LLC, Clayson was involved in making 
an offer to purchase the cheese plant and restaurant. Clayson and Randall signed a Purchase 
and Sale Agreement on October 17,2008 in which they agreed to buy the Star Valley Cheese 
Plant from its owner, Morris Farinella, in its "present condition" for $800,000 (Exhibit D). 
The testimony about Clayson's involvement in the execution of that agreement was disputed. 
Clayson testified that he signed the agreement because he had the relationship with Farinella 
and because Zebe and Lawson told him they were not going to spend any money until they 
got ownership and they were making no effort to purchase the cheese plant and restaurant. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 217, L 5 - p. 220, L 20) Zebe testified that he decided to make an offer at the 
prompting of Jeff Randall in a phone conversation on October 16,2008. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 374, 
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L 5 - p. 379, L 5) Randall testified that he made the decision on October 16,2008 to make 
an offer of $800,000 to get the ball rolling because if the cheese plant opened he felt he 
would benefit from revenue earned from trucking milk to the plant. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 469, L 
12 - p. 472, L 10) 
The following day, October 17,2008, Randall drove with Clayson to the Star Valley 
restaurant and met with Zebe. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 470, L 7 - p. 471, L 4) Both Randall and Zebe 
recalled that Zebe called the realtor to tell him he was going to make an offer, but the realtor 
and Zebe got into an argument and Zebe told Randall he had changed his mind and was not 
going to make the offer. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 374, L 12 - p. 378, L 3; p. 471, L 5 - p. 472, L 23) 
Randall persisted and Zebe agreed to have Randall make the offer of $800,000 for him but 
instructed him to have the words "and/or assigns" included so that Randall could assign the 
PSA to Zebe. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 377, LL 13 - 22) Randall stated that he did not know where the 
realtor lived and Clayson offered to show him. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 377, L. 23 - p. 378, L 3) 
Randall testified that neither he nor Clayson had the money to perfonn and Randall's 
intent was to make the offer on behalf of Zebe and assign it to Zebe. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 220, LL 
16 - 24; Tr. Vol. II, 469, LL 22 - 25; p. 474, LL 2- 6; p. 476, LL 9 - 22) Zebe paid the 
$10,000 earnest money called for in the PSA which was executed by Randall and Clayson 
on October 17,2008. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 427, L 23 - p. 428, L 7; p. 475, L 25 - p. 476, L 8) 
Later on October 17,2008, Randall and Clayson returned to the Star Valley restaurant 
and presented Zebe with the PSA which had been executed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 478, L 25 - 479, 
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L. 11) Zebe was upset because he did not see the "and/or assigns" language in the document 
and because Clayson's name was on the document. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 378, L. 16 - P. 379, L 5; 
p. 479, LL 12 - 23) The PSA did, in fact, have the "and/or assigns" language, but it was on 
the third page at line 117. (Exhibit D; Tr. Vol. II, p. 479, L 24 - P. 480, L 15) Randall told 
Zebe that it did not make any difference whether Clayson's name was on the PSA because 
they were going to assign it to Zebe anyway. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 480, LL 16 - 22) 
The PSA provided that the buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, 
restaurant . . . with all improvements thereon, easements and other appurtenances and 
all fixtures of a permanent nature currently on the premises except as hereinafter provided, 
in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted . . ." (Exhibit D; Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 249, L 5 - p. 251, L 5) Clayson admitted this included all the improvements he made to 
the cheese plant and restaurant while it was owned by Morris Farinella. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, 
L 17-p.251,LI0) 
Whatever involvement Clayson had in executing the PSA, his interest in it was 
relinquished when he later executed an assignment. Both Randall and Clayson admit that on 
November 4, 2008, they assigned all their right title and interest in the October 17, 2008 
PSA to SVC, LLC whose only members at that time were Zebe and Lawson. (Exhibit N; Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 252, LL 10 - 25; Tr. Vol. II, p. 481, L 3 - p. 484, L 1) Clayson knew he was not 
a member ofSVC, LLC when he signed the assignment. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 253, LL 19 - 22) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - PAGE 6 
Zebe and Lawson eventually acquired title to the cheese plant and restaurant. The 
transaction in which Zebe and Lawson purchased the restaurant and plant from Morris 
Farinella (or his company) closed on February 24,2009. Zebe and Lawson paid $800,000 
for the cheese plant and restaurant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 296, L 24 - p. 297, L 15; Tr. Vol. II, 385, 
L 16 - p. 386, L 3) 
After Zebe and Lawson purchased the restaurant and plant, Dairy Systems which 
perfonned work on the cheese plant at the request of Clayson sued Zebe and Lawson in 
Wyoming for its charges to renovate the cheese plant. That case is still pending. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 240, L 7 - p. 247, L 11) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Do the facts support the trial court's conclusion that an implied-in-fact contract 
existed requiring Zebe and Lawson to reimburse Clayson? 
2. Does an implied-in-fact contract require proof that the party to be held responsible 
requested perfonnance? 
3. If an implied-in-fact contract does not require proof that the party to be held 
responsible requested perfonnance, must the party with the burden of proof establish 
a clear understanding by both parties ofthe items and the amount to be reimbursed as 
part of the elements of the implied-in-fact contract to be proved? 
4. Do the facts support the trial court's conclusion that Zebe and Lawson were unjustly 
enriched by Clayson's refurbishments to the cheese plant and restaurant before they 
purchased it? 
5. Can a party be unjustly enriched by improvements to property the party does not own 
but later purchases from the owner for good and valuable consideration? 
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ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it found both an implied in fact contract and an implied in 
law contract. The trial court mixed the elements of these two distinct equitable remedies and 
thereby erroneously found in favor of Clayson. Although the general rule for finding an 
implied in fact contract requires performance at the request ofthe party to be held responsible 
and although the trial court admitted such did not exist, it still found for Clayson because of 
statements made after the fact by Zebe. The absence of performance at the request of Zebe 
and Lawson is most consistent with the implied in law contract where the recipient need not 
have requested the services. However, the recipient is only liable for unjust enrichment 
under the implied in law remedy. Here there was no unjust enrichment because Zebe and 
Lawson bought and paid for the restaurant and plant including Clayson's improvements. 
Only by ignoring the distinctions between the equitable remedies of implied in fact and 
implied in law contracts could the trial court find in favor of Clayson. The judgment in favor 
of Clayson should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for entry of 
judgment in favor of the defendants denying Clayson's claims for reimbursement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our standard of review is well-established. Findings of fact will not be 
set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. Conway, 121 
Idaho 1000,1004,829 P.2d 1349,1353 (1992) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a». Where 
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and thus will not be 
disturbed by this Court. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 
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973 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district court's 
conclusions of law to detennine whether the court correctly stated the 
applicable law and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts 
found. Conleyv. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 269, 985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999). 
Kennedy v. Schneider, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 82, 4-5 (Idaho May 26, 2011) 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES CREATED A CONTRACT-IN-FACT 
WHEREBY DEFENDANTS AGREED TO REIMBURSE PLAINTIFF FOR 
THE EXPENSES SHOWN TO HA VE BEEN INCURRED IN REFURBISHING 
THE PLANT 
In its decision granting Defendants' motion for SUl1ll1lary jUdgment in part, the trial 
court determined that no express contract existed in which Zebe and Lawson would 
reimburse Clayson for his expenses in refurbishing the cheese plant and restaurant. (R. Vol. 
2, pp. 254 - 258) To recover Clayson had to prove an "implied-in-fact" or an "implied-in-
law" contract. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 258 - 262) 
In its Memorandum Decision after the trial, the trial court concluded that Clayson 
proved an implied-in-fact contract. The trial court reasoned that it was "not finding a 
contract implied in fact based on Defendants' promise to pay Clayson for refurbishing 
expenses before they were incurred." (R. Vol. 4, p. 738) In fact, Clayson stipulated that none 
of the expenses were incurred and none of his labor was perfonned at the request ofZebe and 
Lawson. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL 1 - 10) Therefore, in finding an implied in fact contract the 
trial court departed from the general rul e that "where the conduct of the parties allows the 
dual inferences that one perfonned at the other's request and that the requesting party 
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promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact."2 Instead offollowing 
the general rule, the trial court concluded "that an implied-in-fact contract exists because 
Defendants (sic) conduct and statements create an implied agreement to pay Clayson's 
refurbishment expenses when he transferred operation of the Plant and restaurant to 
Defendants on October 8, 2008." (R. Vol. 4, p. 738) 
On October 8, 2008 Clayson did not own the Plant and neither did Zebe and Lawson. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 248, L 21 - p. 349, L 3~ Tr. Vol. II, p. 385, LL 16 - 23) That fact makes it 
unlikely that Zebe and Lawson would agree to reimburse Clayson for expenses he incurred 
and work he performed on a property none ofthem owned3• However, the trial court ignored 
the unlikely nature of such an agreement and concluded that there was an implied in fact 
agreement to reimburse Clayson because Zebe made statements after October 8, 2008 in 
which he stated he was going to pay Clayson something, used Clayson's payment to Dairy 
Systems in negotiations with Dairy Systems and submitted a business plan to support a bank 
2 
Gray v. Tri-Way Canstr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378,387 (Idaho 2009) 
3Idaho's betterment statutes permit an improver to recover the cost of improvements only 
if the improvements were made under color of title and in good faith. Fauser v. Paige, 101 Idaho 
294,297 (Idaho 1980) (An improver can recover if the improvements were made under color of 
title and in good faith.) See also Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 146 (Idaho 2007) Here Clayson 
never attempted to recover under Idaho's betterment statutes because he never claimed to have 
been the owner of the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 215, L 21 - p. 216, L 4; 248, LL 21 - 24) FouseI' v. 
Paige, 101 Idaho 294, 297 (Idaho 1980) (color of title has reference to something which has the 
appearance or gives the semblance of title but is not such in fact) 
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loan to purchase the Plant which touted the improvements Clayson made4. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 734 
- 736) 
The trial court did not cite any case law for its conclusion that "after the fact" 
statements can establish an "implied-in-fact" contract to reimburse Clayson. Because the 
vast majority ofIdaho decision on "implied-in-fact" contracts follow the general rule, Idaho 
authority on this issue is sparse5. 
If the trial court's reasoning is correct that it is not necessary to establish that Zebe and 
Lawson requested Clayson to do the refurbishment to prove an implied-in-fact contract, then 
the Idaho case law requires, at a minimum, that Clayson prove that "the conduct of the parties 
implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists." Continental Forest 
Prods. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743 (Idaho 1974) See also Willnerdv. Sybase, 
Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114544 (D. Idaho Oct. 26, 2010) (In order to assert breach of 
an implied-in-fact contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that both parties to the contract are 
aware of the contract's existence) Clayson also has the burden of proving all the elements of 
4As will be discussed below, such reasoning is more consistent with an unjust enrichment 
theory than it is with an implied-in-fact contract theory. 
5While there are earlier Idaho cases which make reference to quantum meruit and/or 
implied contracts, one of the earliest Idaho cases explaining the "implied-in-fact contract" theory 
ofrecovery stated: "An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested 
by the conduct of the pariies, witlt tlte request of one party, and pelformance by tlte otlter party 
often being illferred from the circumstances attending the performance." Clements v. Jungert, 
90 Idaho 143, 153 (Idaho 1965) All subsequent "implied-in-fact contract" decisions suggest that 
the factual basis for finding an implied in fact contract requires perfonnance at the request of the 
paIiy to be held responsible as the necessary requirement. 
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a contract. As explained in GEM Indus. v. Sun Trust Bank, 700 F. Supp. 2d 915,922 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010): 
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract, as with an express 
contract, "hinge[ s] upon proof of all the elements of a contract." Stepp v. 
Freeman, 119 Ohio App. 3d 68, 74, 694 N.E.2d 510 (1992). The difference is 
that mutual assent to the essential elements of an implied-in-fact contract is 
shown not by an express offer and acceptance, but by the "surrounding 
circumstances, including the conduct and declarations of the parties[.]" Id. 
Those circumstances must "make it inferable that the contract exists as a 
matter of tacit understanding." Id 
The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by 
all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly 
enough to show what the parties have agreed. State v. Korn, 224 P .3d 480, 482 (Idaho 2009) 
Contract fonnation requires mutual assent. Thompson v. Pike, 122 
Idaho 690, 696,838 P.2d 293,299 (1992). "A distinct understanding common 
to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist." Id. Whether mutual 
assent exists is a question of fact. Id. 
Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378,384 (Idaho 2009) 
"In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct understanding 
common to both parties. The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its 
tenns, and, if any portion of the proposed tenns is unsettled and unprovided 
for, there is no contract. (9 Cyc. 245.) An offer to enter into a contractual 
relation must be so complete that upon acceptance an agreement is formed 
which contains all of the tenns necessary to detennine whether the contract has 
been perfonned or not. (1 Page on Contracts, § 27; 9 Cyc. 248.) An 
acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and 
unconditional, and must not modifY or introduce any new terms into the offer. 
(l Page on Contracts, § 45; 9 Cyc. 267.) An acceptance which varies from the 
tenns of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which 
must in tum be accepted by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract. 
(9 Cyc. 290.) After an offer has been rejected by making a counter proposal, 
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it cannot be later accepted without a renewed consent of the offerer. (9 eye. 
290.)" 
Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175-176 (Idaho 1946) 
Before trial, the trial court found on motion for summary judgment that no express 
contract existed between the parties to reimburse Clayson. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 254 - 258) The 
testimony at trial did not change that conclusion. 
Clayson's own testimony proved that there was no plain or explicit understanding 
about what was agreed. Clayson claimed all sorts of personal expenses unrelated to 
refurbishment of the plant or restaurant which were disallowed. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 76, L 5 - p. 
157, L 24; Tr. Vol. II, p. 305, L 1 - p. 312, L 2) In total, Clayson claimed Zebe and Lawson 
agreed to reimburse him approximately $130,000 for bills he paid. (Tr. Vol. I,pp. 201 - 204) 
The bills listed on the first page of Exhibit "F" do not total anything close to $130,0006• The 
bills Clayson could actually substantiate with a check or credit card was a different amount, 
i.e. $97,310.24 which includes the $50,000 check to Dairy Systems. (R. Vol. 4, p. 740) What 
was the "after the fact" contract? Was there an agreement to reimburse Clayson's personal 
expenses? Was the agreement only to reimburse refurbishment expenses? Was the 
agreement that Clayson would be reimbursed $130,000? Was it $97,31O.24? Was it 
$47,310.24? Was it $50,000? Was it $69,600. Clayson himself did not know what the 
agreement was. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 203, L 6 - p. 202 L 11) Zebe and Lawson denied the existence 
6The total is $69,600 
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of any such agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 380, LL l3 - 18; p. 429, L 12 - p. 432, L 10) Zebe's 
January 14,2009 email (Exhibit S) does not save this claim because it contains a different 
number, "245k", which Zebe testified was a reference to the Dairy Systems bill, not the bills 
which Clayson is now seeking to recover under a theory of implied-in-fact contract. (Tr. 
Vol. II, pp. 313 - 317) While that e-mail may be significant in Dairy System's lawsuit in 
Wyoming, it does not support an implied-in-fact agreement between Clayson and/or Zebe 
and/or Lawson. 
Clayson failed to carry his burden of proving an implied-in-fact contract. Clayson did 
not prove that he incurred the debts because Zebe and Lawson encouraged him to or asked 
him to incur the debts such that an inference was created that Zebe and Lawson intended to 
reimburse Clayson for the debts they asked him to incur. Even if, as the trial court suggests, 
the conduct of the parties shows an intent to reimburse Clayson for something, the conduct 
of the parties and the circumstances do not support an inference that the parties ever came 
to agreement as to what expenses Clayson would be reimbursed or the amount Clayson 
would be reimbursed. The absence of agreement on such critical issues is fatal to even an 
"after the fact" implied-in-fact contract. Clayson did not prove the terms of the agreement. 
Fox v. Mf. W Elec., 137 Idaho 703, 708 (Idaho 2002) (implied-in-fact contract is grounded 
in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding) Clayson did not prove that both parties 
were even aware of the existence of the implied-in-fact contract. Willnerd, supra. The 
implied-in-fact contract found by the trial court is not supported by the facts and 
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circumstances, is speculative and the trial court erred in finding an implied-in-fact agreement 
to reimburse Clayson. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT ZEBE AND 
LAWSON WERE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AND THEREFORE REQUIRED 
TO REIMBURSE CLAYSON FOR THE EXPENSES SHOWN TO HAVE 
BEEN INCURRED IN REFURBISHING THE PLANT UNDER THE THEORY 
OF CONTRACT IMPLIED IN LAW 
To recover on a contract implied in law, the claimant must show that 
the services were rendered with the reasonable expectation that the person who 
benefited from them would pay for them. Nagele v. Miller, 73 Idaho 441,444, 
253 P.2d 233,235 (1953). The recipient may not have requested the services, 
but if the recipient knowingly and voluntarily accepts the benefits under 
circumstances where it would be unjust if the recipient did not pay for them, 
the courts will impose an obligation to pay. Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 
Idaho 663, 666, 619 P.2d 1116,1119 (1980); Weberv. Eastern Idaho Packing 
Corp., 94 Idaho 694, 697, 496 P.2d 693, 696 (1972), overruled on other 
grounds by Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P.2d 590, 597 (1975); 
Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 51, 324 P.2d 380, 384 (1958); Reddy v. 
Johnston, 77 Idaho 402,406,293 P.2d 945, 947 (1956); Nagele, 73 Idaho at 
444,253 P.2d at 235. 
Barth v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho 707,710 (Idaho 1996) 
Because it is undisputed that Zebe and Lawson did not request the services and 
expenses which Clayson provided7, if Clayson was to recover from Zebe and Lawson it had 
to have been under the theory of a contract implied in law which is not a contract at all. 
"A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation 
imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without 
reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties .... 111 Id. The measure 
of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim "is not the actual amount of the 
enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as bet\¥een h¥o parties it 
7Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL 1 - 10 
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would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco CanstI'. Co,) Inc. v. Bannock 
Paving Co.) Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff 
has the burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit and of proving 
the amount of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. 
Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017,829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 388-389 (Idaho 2009) 
It was improper in this case for the trial court to find Zebe and Lawson were unjustly 
enriched because they received nothing from Clayson. Clayson made the improvements 
while neither he nor Zebe and Lawson were owners of the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 248, L 
21 - p., 250, L 25) The owner, Morris Farinella, was the only person who received any 
benefit from what Clayson did. Zebe and Lawson did not receive the property for free. They 
paid $800,000 to buy it from Morris Farinella. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 296, L 24 - p. 297, L 15; Tr. 
Vol. II, 385, L 16 - p. 386, L 3) 
The prima facie case for unjust enrichment is "(1) a benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the 
plaintiff of the value thereof." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 
Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999) (quoting Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 
378,382,941 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1997)). Inequity exists if a transaction 
is inherently unfair. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 910, 42 P.3d 698, 703 
(2002). Yet the doctrine "does not operate to rescue a party from the 
consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a bad one." George v. Tanner, 
108 Idaho 40, 43,696 P.2d 891,894 (1985). 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Family Ltd. P'ship, 249 P.3d 382,389 (Idaho 2011) 
Clayson did not confer a benefit on Zebe and Lawson. He conferred a benefit on the 
owner of the property, Morris Farinella. Zebe and Lawson did not appreciate any benefit 
from Clayson because they did not receive the improvements until after they paid a 
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substantial purchase price to Morris Farinella. There was nothing inequitable aboutZebe and 
Lawson retaining whatever benefit Clayson bestowed on the property because Zebe and 
Lawson bought and paid for the property, including the improvements. Clayson did not 
contribute to the purchase price and assigned all of his rights in the PSA with Farinella to 
Zebe and Lawson because he did not have the money to complete the transaction. The trial 
court did not find that the assignment was inequitable or unfair. There is simply no factual 
basis to support the trial court's conclusion that Zebe and Lawson were unjustly enriched. 
The trial court erred in finding an implied-in-Iaw contract which required Zebe and Lawson 
to reimburse Clayson after they bought and paid for the property and improvements. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
It is well established under Idaho law that claims for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment can be considered commercial transactions for purposes of attorney fee awards 
under 1. C. § 12-120(3). Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912,921 
(Idaho 2008) Plaintiff s Complaint and Amended Complaint alleged breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment. The case went to trial on equitable issues which included unjust 
enrichment. The trial court's decision in favor of Clayson included unjust enrichment as one 
of the bases for the decision. 
IfZebe and Lawson prevail on this appeal they will have prevailed against Clayson's 
attempts to enforce an express or implied agreement to reimburse him for expenses he 
incurred in improving a plant and restaurant which he claimed was part of a commercial 
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transaction between himself and Zebe and Lawson. Although denied by Zebe and Lawson, 
the gravamen of all ofthe claims alleged by Clayson was the alleged commercial transaction 
between the parties. As the prevailing party on appeal, Zebe and Lawson should be entitled 
to an award of a reasonable attorney fee under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
CONCLUSION 
Because it was stipulated that none of the expenses for which Clayson sought 
reimbursement were incurred and none of his labor was perfonned at the request of Zebe and 
Lawson, the elements of the implied-in-fact remedy were not proven. The trial court 
overlooked that failure of proof and looked to Zebe' s "after the fact" statements to prove the 
implied-in-fact contract. However, there was no implied or express agreement as to how 
much Clayson was to be reimbursed or for what he was to be reimbursed. The trial court 
ignored that failure of proof and concl uded that Zebe and Lawson benefitted from Clayson's 
expenditures. By doing so the trial court incorporated an element of the implied-in-law 
remedy of unjust enrichment into its implied-in-fact contract analysis. However, the trial 
court completely failed to analyze whether there had been urUust enrichment. Because 
neither Clayson nor Zebe and Lawson owned the property which Clayson claimed to have 
improved, Zebe and Lawson had to buy and pay for the property and the improvements to 
benefit from the improvements. The fact that Zebe and Lawson bought and paid for the 
improvements should have negated the claim that Zebe and Lawson were urUustly enriched, 
but the trial court failed to ever analyze whether the subsequent purchase impacted the unjust 
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enrichment claim in reaching its decision that Clayson was entitled to be reimbursed 
$97,310.24 by Zebe and Lawson. Under close analysis it is clear that the trial court 
improperIymixed and matched the elements of impli ed-in-fact and implied-in-Iaw contracts 
to reach its decision. 
Zebe and Lawson request this Court to reverse the judgment in favor of Clayson and 
remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Zebe and Lawson finding that Clayson 
failed to prove an implied-in-fact or implied-in-Iaw contract for reimbursement. Zebe and 
Lawson request their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal. 
a'f/---
DATED this / day of June, 2011. 
PER & LARSEN 
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